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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Daniel Parsons appeals following jury trial convictions for the offenses 
of aiding and abetting robbery and felony eluding a peace officer as well as persistent 
violator. Mr. Parsons here only challenges the persistent violator conviction/finding and 
enhanced sentence based on it. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While this matter was the subject of a jury trial, the facts were succinctly 
described in the PSI: 
... the attached police reports indicate that on 10/20/2010 co-defendant 
Felicia Parsons, the defendant's wife, entered the Broadway Key Bank 
wearing a wig, sunglasses, a black sweater and gloves, and handed bank 
teller Paul Lucariello a note stating "WE HAVE GUNS! MONEY IN BAG!" 
Mr. Lucariello put money into the bag Mrs. Parson had placed on his 
counter, and observed Mrs. Parsons leave the bank and walk quickly from 
the building. Branch manager Judy Batten pushed the alarm button and 
summoned law enforcement. 
Police located and began pursuing the defendants on 1-84. This defendant 
was driving, weaving in and out of traffic at speeds far over the speed 
limit, and through construction zones. The defendant eventually lost 
control of his car, left the roadway and crashed into private property, 
hitting a storage shed in the back yard at 15126 Ventia Ct., in Nampa, 10. 
Officers secured the scene, had the defendants transported to Saint 
Alphonsus Hospital for medical treatment, and ultimately transported them 
to the Ada County Jail. 
PSI, p. 2. 
Mr. Parsons was charged by criminal complaint with aiding and abetting robbery 
and felony eluding a police officer. (R. p. 13-14.) After a preliminary hearing he was 
bound over to district court, where an information charged him with the above crimes. 
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(R. p. 29, 38-39.) Later, an information part" charged him with persistent violator. (R. 
p. 107). 
Mr. Parsons' case was tried to a jury (co-defendant Felicia Parsons pled guilty) 
who found him guilty as charged. (R. p. 217-218.) The jury then found him to be a 
persistent violator. (R. p. 219.) 
The court sentenced Mr. Parsons to fixed life on the robbery, as well as a 
consecutive fixed life sentence on the eluding as enhanced by the persistent violator. 
(R. p. 226). 
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 237.) 
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ISSUE 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORALLY CHANGED A JURY 
INSTRUCTION IN A CONFUSING WAY THAT COULD HAVE MISLED THE JURY 
INTO BELIEVING THAT IT NEED NOT FIND AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE 
BECAUSE IT HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORALLY CHANGED A JURY INSTRUCTION IN A 
CONFUSING WAY THAT COULD HAVE MISLED THE JURY INTO BELIEVING 
THAT IT NEED NOT FIND AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE BECAUSE IT HAD 
ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED 
A. Standard of Review 
The standard of review for jury instruction issues was recently explained by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Draper, 261 P.3d 853 (2011), by reference to other 
recent Supreme Court cases: 
"Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and 
state the applicable law is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. Therefore, the correctness of a jury instruction 
depends on whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction. 
We look at the jury instructions as a whole, not individually, to determine 
whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed. An erroneous 
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a 
whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party. 
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 , 150 Idaho 355, 247 P.3d 582, 600-
01 (2010). 
An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal. 
Moreover, Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) provides that "[n]o party may assign 
as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection." 
However, this Court traditionally has reviewed "fundamental" errors on 
appeal, even when no objection was raised at trial. An error is 
fundamental when it "so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces 
manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to 
due process." 
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State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). 
State v. Draper, 261 P.3d at 864-865 (internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court continued: 
Draper's argument is that the jury instructions relieved the State of its duty 
to prove all elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. If these 
arguments are correct, Draper has been denied his right to due process 
and those errors would rise to the level of fundamental error. "The United 
States Supreme Court has held that in criminal trials 'the State must prove 
every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if 
it fails to give effect to that requirement.'" Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 170 
P.3d at 892 (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437, 124 S. Ct. 
1830, 158 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2004)). Here, if the instruction omitted a 
contested element of the crime, it would have violated Draper's due 
process rights and would consequently rise to the level of fundamental 
error. 
Id. at 865. 
B. The jUry instructions 
In this case, the instructional error is a sentence which the court added to the 
oral instructions that does not appear in the written instructions. 1 Therefore, Appellant 
will explain the sequence of events occurring in the trial court and provide verbatim the 
oral instructions given with the offending language underlined. 
After the jury returned its verdicts of guilty on the underlying offenses, the court 
instructed it as follows: 
Now, unfortunately, your job is not quite complete. We're going to take a 
brief recess because we need to prepare the jury instructions on this. But I 
will tell you that for the purpose of subjecting the defendant Daniel Dale 
Parsons, Junior, to a more severe punishment, the defendant has been 
charged in the information not only with the offense of aiding and abetting 
robbery and eluding, on which charges you have now rendered your 
1 Other than the one sentence, the written instructions and oral instructions are 
substantially the same. 
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verdict, but with being a persistent violator of the law in that as it is alleged 
he has heretofore been at least two times convicted of a felony. 
Idaho Code 19-2514 provides that any person convicted for a third time of 
the commission of a felony shall be considered a persistent violator of the 
law. This section does not create a new crime, but deals only with the 
status of an accused and renders him liable to a greater punishment for 
the latest conviction than that which might have been inflicted had there 
not been two prior convictions. 
The Defendant has denied the alleged prior convictions. You must now 
determine and find whether or not the allegation of two or more prior 
convictions is true. 
For purpose of this finding, the following additional instructions will be 
given to you which you'll consider along with the pertinent instructions 
which have heretofore been given to you. We'll hear opening [sic] 
argument at this time. 
Tr. p. 616, In. 10-p. 617, In. 15. 
The parties proceeded to give their opening statements. The court then gave 
them the following instruction: 
Before you present your first witness, I just want to indicate to the jury what 
the state is alleging. Having found the defendant guilty of aiding and 
abetting robbery and eluding you must next consider whether the 
defendant has been convicted on at least two prior occasions of felony 
offenses. 
The state alleges the defendant has prior convictions as follows: 
Count One, that the defendant, Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, on or about the 
24th day of July, 1981, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty plea for 
the crime of unlawful sale of a controlled substance, a felony, in the county 
of Washoe, State of Nevada by virtue of that certain judgment of conviction 
made and entered in Case No. C81-303; and, Count Two, that the 
defendant, Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, on or about the 22nd day of May 
1987, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty plea for commission of 
conspiracy to commit robbery with the use of a firearm, a felony, in the 
county of Washoe, state of Idaho--state of Nevada, by virtue of the certain 
judgment of conviction made and entered in Case No. C86-1702; and/or, 
Count Three, that the defendant, Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, on or about 
the 22nd day of May 1987 was sentenced after a conviction or guilty plea 
for the crime of burglary, a felony, in the county of Washoe, state of 
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Nevada, by virtue of that certain judgment of conviction made and entered 
in Case No. C86-1700; and/or, Count Four, that the defendant, Daniel D. 
Parsons, Junior, on or about the 22nd day of May 1987, was sentenced 
after a conviction or guilty plea for the crime of burglary, a felony, in the 
county of Washoe, State of Nevada, by virtue of a certain judgment of 
conviction made and entered in Case No. C86-1703. 
The existence of a prior conviction must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt and your decision must be unanimous. 
Tr. p. 618, In. 20-p. 620, In. 8. 
After the evidence, the post proof instructions were as follows 
Just as the State has the burden of proving all of the elements of the crime 
of aiding and abetting robbery and eluding beyond a reasonable doubt, so 
the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, has been convicted of at least two 
prior felonies by finding the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
at least two of the counts alleged in the Information Part II. 
Thus in this case if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant has been convicted of at least two of the crimes listed 
in Part II of the information and that each of the same two crimes is a 
felony, then you should find that the defendant is a persistent violator of 
the law. Should the evidence fail to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you should find the defendant is not a persistent violator of the law. 
Now, for the purpose of this instruction, you must find that Count One has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In considering whether the Defendant is a persistent violator of the law, 
you should not be influenced by the fact that you have heretofore found 
him guilty of the crime of aiding and abetting robbery and eluding. 
Your conclusion as to whether the defendant is a persistent violator of the 
law must be based upon the evidence based on this issue uninfluenced by 
the fact that the defendant has been convicted of aiding and abetting 
robbery and eluding. 
When you retire to the jury room, you will again elect one of your persons 
as foreperson. Your verdict as to whether the defendant is a persistent 
violator must be unanimous. 
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When you have agreed upon your verdict, your foreman will sign the same 
and you will return it into open court. A form of verdict suitable to any 
conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you with these instructions. 
Tr. p. 633, In. 2-p. 634, In. 19. 
The parties then gave closing arguments. The prosecutor's argument was as 
follows in relevant part: 
The judge instructed you that you need to find Count One and what she 
meant by that-or my reading of what she meant by that is there's this 
judgment, which is the second to the last, page, the first page forward 
from the blue page, which is-the case number's listed here in the upper 
left and it's the 1981 conviction. 
The remainder of the judgments have their case numbers also visible up 
here on the left-hand upper corner and--however, they are all listed in the 
text together. And so there's three different case numbers and three 
charges; the burglary, the conspiracy to commit robbery with the use of a 
firearm and being an ex-felon in the possession of a firearm. 
And so what the instruction is calling on you to do is to determine that this 
is in regard to Mr. Parsons and that at least one of these that are sort of 
listed here together are also him that together he's been convicted twice 
previously. 
Because these are all listed on the same judgment, we ask you not to find 
just two of these, but one of these and the one from the earlier dates 
because there's more separation in time and it's more proper under the 
rules and the law. 
Tr. p. 635, In. 1-p. 636, In. 2. 
After the jury went out, the court made the following record: 
I want to make it really clear for the record that they had to find that the 
first count was, in fact, proven because I think that's what the intent was 
of the way in which we've written it. And even though it's not in the written 
instructions, the law is very clear that the oral instructions are actually 
what control. 
I am not going to rewrite that because I think that the point-the point 
here is we want to make sure that it cannot be later argued that they didn't 
find him on the one, they just found him on these other three. I want to 
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make it clear that they have to find the one before they find the rest of 
them. Okay. Well just stand in recess. I would suggest don't go too far. 
Tr. p. 637, Ins. 5-19. 
C. The district court erred by changing the oral instruction in a way that made it 
confusing and could have misled the jUry into believing that Count I had already 
been established and it must accept it 
Again, the offending language which was added to the oral jury instruction was 
as follows: "Now, for the purpose of this instruction, you must find that Count One has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." As will be discussed below, this sentence 
can mean two very different things. 
The first meaning is what was intended by the state and the court. Unfortunately, 
the state and court did not accomplish what it set out to do with the added language. 
While it can be determined from the full record what has going on, it would not have 
been clear to the jury which was instructed as above. 
As can be gleaned from the prosecutor's remarks and the record made by the 
court outside the presence of the jury, the reason the court modified the instruction and 
inserted the additional language is because the state's Information Part II alleged four 
prior felony convictions which it charged as Count I--IV. Count I was a conviction 
occurring in 1981, and Counts II, III & IV were convictions all occurring on May 22, 
1987. So the point of the instruction was that the state (and court) wanted the jury to 
find 1) that the 1981 conviction did occur, and 2) that one of the three convictions 
occurring on May 22, 1987, did occur, for a total of two prior felony convictions. What 
the state (and court) did not want to happen is for the jury to find that the two 
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convictions upon which the persistent violator was based both occurred on May 22, 
1987. 
While this is the idea that the state (and court) wanted to impart, it is not 
necessarily what the instruction impartred. One interpretation of the instruction may 
well be that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conviction listed in 
Count I really occurred. But even this interpretation is confusing, where Count I is 
singled out and so appears to be the subject of special treatment. 
Worse still is the other interpretation of that instruction, which is the court was 
instructing the jury that said conviction in Count I had in fact occurred (similar to when 
the court instructs a jury on a stipulation). This is a reasonable interpretation as well, 
given the verb tense, a comparison with the portion of the instruction immediately 
preceding it, and because the sentence is really an unexplained non-sequitor dropped 
into the instructions. If the jury interpreted it this way, it would then believe that all it 
needed to do was to find that one other conviction occurred, which when combined with 
Count I, provided the required two prior convictions. 
It cannot be seriously argued that the instruction as given is not confusing. At 
the very least this is shown by the prosecutor's struggles to explain what the instruction 
meant in her closing argument. 2 But even if the prosecutor was successful in imparting 
the notion that the jury had to use the earlier conviction and one of the later convictions, 
it still would not disabuse the jury of the very problem with the instruction, which is it 
seems like the court instructed the jury that Count One had been established and so 
2 However, the prosecutor's interpretation of what the court meant cannot substitute for 
a correct instruction from the court, particularly since the court also instructed the jury 
that it is the court's instruction which the jury must follow. (R. p. 194.) 
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they only needed to find one of the three later counts to find the defendant is a 
persistent violator. Additionally, while the court made its record about what it was trying 
to do, it did not do so before the jury, and so it does not clarify the instruction the jury 
received. 
In short, the instruction here is confusing and could have misled the jury. It is 
impossible to say that the jury could not have read the instruction as eliminating the 
necessity that it decide whether Mr. Parsons had been convicted of a felony in 1981. 
This reading would relieve the state of its burden of proving every element beyond a 
reasonable doubt as required by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. Thus, this issue is reviewable for the first time on appeal as 
fundamental error as explained in Draper, supra. 
Further, Appellant asserts that harmless error does not apply and the error is per 
se reversible. This is not the case of a mere missing element whereby harmless error 
review is allowable as per State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961,976 (2010). 
Rather, Appellant asserts that the error is more akin to the court directing a verdict on 
that element. This is because the instruction does not simply ignore an element that 
the jury has to find, but rather, appears to direct the jury that the element has already 
been found so rather than the jury needing to find two prior convictions, it needed only 
find one more in addition to the apparently already established conviction. 
Of course, a court cannot direct a verdict against a defendant nor the jury 
directed to come forward with a such verdict. The United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this principle in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999): 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, also suggests that if a failure to charge on an 
uncontested element of the offense may be harmless error, the next step 
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will be to allow a directed verdict against a defendant in a criminal case 
contrary to Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460, 106 S. Ct. 
3101 (1986). Happily, our course of constitutional adjudication has not 
been characterized by this "in for a penny, in for a pound" approach. We 
have no hesitation reaffirming Rose at the same time that we subject the 
narrow class of cases like the present one to harmless-error review. 
Id., n. 2. 
The case referred to, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1986), explained as 
follows: 
Similarly, harmless-error analysis presumably would not apply if a court 
directed a verdict for the prosecution in a criminal trial by jury. We have 
stated that "a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of 
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict ... 
regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that 
direction." This rule stems from the Sixth Amendment's clear command to 
afford jury trials in serious criminal cases. Where that right is altogether 
denied, the State cannot contend that the deprivation was harmless 
because the evidence established the defendant's guilt; the error in such a 
case is that the wrong entity judged the defendant guilty. 
Id., p. 578 (internal citations omitted). 
By analogy to Rose, harmless error is not the proper test because the instruction 
appears to in part direct a verdict against the defendant because it appears to provide 
that the 1981 felony had already been established and the jury must accept it. Given 
this, harmless error review should not apply and instead the error is per se reversible. 
Therefore, both the jury convictionlfinding of persistent violator and its resulting fixed 
life sentence for the felony eluding must be reversed and vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for all the reasons above, Mr. Parsons requests this Court reverse 
and vacate the persistent violator finding/conviction and the enhanced life sentence for 
/ 
eluding police. dr'-
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